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II. *On the Philosophy of the Hindus. Part I.* By HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, Esq., Director R.A.S., F.R.S., &c.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE *Hindus*, as is well known, possess various ancient systems of philosophy, which they consider to be orthodox, as consistent with the theology and metaphysics of the *Védas*; and have likewise preserved divers systems deemed heretical, as incompatible with the doctrines of their holy books.

The two *Mimánsás* (for there are two schools of metaphysics under this title) are emphatically orthodox. The prior one (*púrva*) which has JAİMİNĪ for its founder, teaches the art of reasoning, with the express view of aiding the interpretation of the *Védas*. The latter (*Uttara*) commonly called *Védánta*, and attributed to VYÁSA, deduces from the text of the Indian scriptures, a refined psychology, which goes to a denial of a material world.

The *Nyáya*, of which GÓTAMA is the acknowledged author, furnishes a philosophical arrangement, with strict rules of reasoning, not unaptly compared to the dialectics of the Aristotelian school. Another course of philosophy connected with it bears the denomination of *Vaiśéshica*. Its reputed author is CANÁDE; who, like Democritus, maintained the doctrine of atoms.

A different philosophical system, partly heterodox, and partly conformable to the established *Hindu* creed, is the *Sánc'hya*: of which also, as of the preceding, there are two schools; one usually known by that name; the other commonly termed *Yóga*. A succinct exposition of the *Sánc'hya* doctrines is the design of the present essay: they are selected for that purpose, on account of the strong affinity which they manifestly bear to the metaphysical opinions of the sects of *Jina* and *Budd'ha*.

Though not strictly orthodox, both *Sánc'hya*s and the *Vaiśéshica*, as well as the *Nyáya*, are respected and studied by very rigid adherents of the *Védas*, who are taught, however, to reject so much as disagrees, and treasure up what is consonant to their scriptures. " In CANÁDE's doctrine, in " the *Sánc'hya*, and in the *Yóga*, that part, which is inconsistent with the

“ *Védas*, is to be rejected by those who strictly adhere to revelation. In “ JAIMINI’S doctrine, and in VYÁSA’S, there is nothing whatsoever at variance “ with scripture.”*

Heretical treatises of philosophy are very numerous : among which that of CHÁRVÁKA, which exhibits the doctrine of the *Jaina* sect, is most conspicuous : and next to it, the *Pásupáta*.

To them and to the orthodox systems before mentioned, it is not intended here to advert, further than as they are noticed by writers on the *Sánc’hya*, citing opinions of other schools of philosophy, in course of commenting on the text which they are engaged in expounding. It is not my present purpose to exhibit a contrasted view of the tenets of different philosophical schools ; but to present to this Society a summary of the doctrine of a single sect : which will serve, however, to elucidate that of several more.

Of other philosophical sects, the received doctrines in detail may be best reserved for separate notice, in distinct essays to be hereafter submitted to the Society. I must be clearly understood, however, not to pledge myself definitively for that task.

I proceed without further preface to the immediate subject of the present essay :

A system of philosophy, in which precision of reckoning is observed in the enumeration of its principles, is denominated *Sánc’hya* ; a term which has been understood to signify *numeral*, agreeably to the usual acceptation of *sanc’hyá*, number : and hence its analogy to the Pythagorean philosophy has been presumed. But the name may be taken to imply, that its doctrine is founded in the exercise of judgment : for the word, from which it is derived, signifies reasoning or deliberation ;† and that interpretation of its import is countenanced by a passage of the *Bhárata*, where it is said of this sect of philosophers : “ They exercise judgment (*sanc’hyá*), and discuss “ nature and [other] twenty-four principles, and therefore are called “ *Sánc’hya*.”‡

The commentator, who has furnished this quotation, expounds *sanc’hyá*, as here importing ‘ the discovery of soul by means of right discrimination.’‡

The reputed founder of this sect of metaphysical philosophy was CAPILA ; an ancient sage, concerning whose origin and adventures the mythological

* Quotation in VIJNYÁNA—BHICSHU’S—*Capila—bhúshya*.

† *Am. Cosh.* l. 1, 4, 11.

‡ *Cap. Bhásh.*

fables, which occupy the place of history with the *Hindus*, are recounted variously. In GAUDAPÁDA's commentary on the *Sānc'hya-Cáricá*, he is asserted to have been a son of BRAHMÁ; being one of seven great *Rishis* or saints, named in *Purānas* or theogonies, as the offspring of that deity. His two most distinguished disciples, ASURI and PANCHÁŚIC'HA, are there exalted to the same rank and divine origin with himself. Another commentator maintains, that CAPILA was an incarnation of VIŚHŪ. It had been affirmed by a writer on the *Védānta*, upon the authority of a passage quoted by him, wherein CAPILA, the founder of the *Sānc'hya* sect, is identified with *Agni*, fire, that he was an incarnation, not of VIŚHŪ, but of *Agni*. The commentator is not content with the fiery origin conceded to the author. He denies the existence of more than one CAPILA; and insists, that the founder of this sect was an incarnation of VIŚHŪ, born as the son of DÉVADÚTI.*

In fact, the word *capila*, besides its ordinary signification of tawny colour, bears likewise that of fire: and, upon this ambiguity of sense, many legends in the Indian theogonies, concerning the saint of the name, have been grounded: a sample of which will be found quoted by Col. Wilford, in the *Asiatic Researches*.†

A passage, which is cited in the commentaries of GAUDAPÁDA and VÁCHESPATI on the *Cáricá*, assigns to CAPILA intuitive knowledge, and innate virtue, with transcendent power and other perfections born with him at the earliest creation: and this is taken by those scholiasts as relating to the founder of the *Sānc'hya* sect. But another commentator of the *Cáricá*, RÁMACRISHŪ, who belongs to the theistical branch of this sect, affirms that the passage in question concerns ÍŚWARA, or GOD, acknowledged by that school.

A text, quoted in VYÁSA's commentary on PATANJALI's *Yōga-sāstra*,‡ and referred by the annotator VÁCHESPATI, as well as a modern scholiast of the *Yōga-sāstra*, NÁGÓJÍ, to PANCHÁŚIC'HA the disciple of ASURI, describes CAPILA as an incarnation of the Deity: "The holy and first wise one, "entering a mind by himself framed, and becoming the mighty sage " (CAPILA), compassionately revealed this science to ASURI."§

* *Vijnyāna in Cap. bhāsh.*

† Vol. III. p. 355.

‡ *Patanj. Sānc'h. prav.* 1, 25.

§ *Panch. sūtra*, quoted in *Vyāsa's bhāshya*.

It may be questioned whether CAPILA be not altogether a mythological personage, to whom the true author of the doctrine, whoever he was, thought fit to ascribe it.

A collection of *sūtras*, or succinct aphorisms, in six lectures, attributed to CAPILA himself, is extant under the title of *Sānc'hya-pravachana*. As an ancient work (whoever may have been really its author), it must doubtless have been expounded by early scholiasts. But the only commentary, which can at present be referred to by name, is the *Capila-bhāshya*; or, as the author himself cites it in his other works, *Sānc'hya-bhāshya*. The title at full length, in the epigraph of the book, is *Capila-sānc'hya-pravachana-śāstra-bhāshya*. It is by VIJNYĀNA-BHICSHU, a mendicant ascetic (as his designation imports) who composed a separate treatise on the attainment of beatitude in this life, entitled *Sānc'hya-sāra*; and wrote many other works; particularly the *Yōga-vārtica*, consisting of scholia on PATANJALI'S *Yōga-śāstra* and the *Brahme-mīmāṃsā-bhāshya*, which is a commentary on a treatise of *Védānti* philosophy.

It appears from the preface of the *Capila-bhāshya*, that a more compendious tract, in the same form of *sūtras* or aphorisms, bears the title of *Tatwa-samāsa*, and is ascribed to the same author, CAPILA. The scholiast intimates, that both are of equal authority, and in no respect discordant: one being a summary of the greater work; or else this an amplification of the conciser one. The latter was probably the case; for there is much repetition in the *Sānc'hya-pravachana*.

It is avowedly not the earliest treatise on this branch of philosophy: since it contains references to former authorities for particulars, which are but briefly hinted in the *sūtras*;* and it quotes some by name, and among them PANCHASĪC'HA, † the disciple of the reputed author's pupil: an anachronism which appears decisive.

The title of *Sānc'hya-pravachana* seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to PATANJALI'S *Yōga-śāstra*.

If the authority of the scholiast of CAPILA may be trusted, the *Tatwa-samāsa* is the proper text of the *Sānc'hya*; and its doctrine is more fully, but separately set forth, by the two ampler treatises, entitled *Sānc'hya-pravachana*, which contain a fuller exposition of what had been there succinctly delivered: PATANJALI'S work supplying the deficiency of CAPILA'S,

* Cap. 3, 39.

† Cap. 6.

and declaring the existence of GOD, which for argument's sake, and not absolutely and unreservedly, he had denied.

Of the six lectures or chapters, into which the *sútras* are distributed, the three first comprise an exposition of the whole *Sánc'hya* doctrine. The fourth contains illustrative comparisons, with reference to fables and tales. The fifth is controversial, confuting opinions of other sects: which is the case also with part of the first. The sixth and last treats of the most important parts of the doctrine, enlarging upon topics before touched.

The *Cáricá*, which will be forthwith mentioned as the text book or standard authority of the *Sánc'hya*, has an allusion to the contents of the fourth and fifth chapters; professing to be a complete treatise of the science, exclusive of illustrative tales and controversial disquisitions.* The author must have had before him the same collection of *sútras*, or one similarly arranged. His scholiast expressly refers to the numbers of the chapters.†

Whether the *Tatwa-samása* of CAPILA be extant, or whether the *sútras* of PANCHASÍC'HA be so, is not certain. The latter are frequently cited, and by modern authors on the *Sánc'hya*: whence a presumption, that they may be yet forthcoming.

The best text of the *Sánc'hya* is a short treatise in verse, which is denominated *Cáricá*, as memorial verses of other sciences likewise are. The acknowledged author is ÍSWARA-CRĪSHNA, described in the concluding lines or epigraph of the work itself, as having received the doctrine, through a succession of intermediate instructors from PANCHASÍC'HA, by whom it was first promulgated; and who was himself instructed by ASURI, the disciple of CAPILA.‡

This brief tract, containing seventy-two stanzas in *áryá* metre, has been expounded in numerous commentaries.

One of these is the work of GAUDAPÁDA the celebrated scholiast of the *Upanishads* of the *Védas*, and preceptor of SANCARA ACHÁRYA, author likewise of numerous treatises on divers branches of theological philosophy. It is entitled *Sánc'hya-bháshya*.

Another, denominated *Sánc'hya-chandricá*, is by NÁRÁYAÑA TÍRT'HA, who seems from his designation to have been an ascetic. He was author likewise of a gloss on the *Yóga-sástra*, as appears from his own references to it.

* Cít. 72.

† Nár. T.

‡ Cár. 70 and 71.

A third commentary, under the title of *Sānc'hya-tatwa-caumudī*, or more simply *Tatwa-caumudī* (for so it is cited by later commentators) is by VĀCHESPATI MĪŚRA, a native of *Tirhūt*, author of similar works on various other philosophical systems. It appears from the multiplicity of its copies, which are unusually frequent, to be the most approved gloss on the text.

One more commentary, bearing the analogous but simpler title of *Sānc'hya-caumudī*, is by RĀMA-CRĪSHṆĀ BHATTĀCHĀRYA, a learned, and not ancient writer of Bengal, who has for the most part followed preceding commentators, borrowing frequently from NĀRĀYAṆĀ TĪRT'HA, though taking the title of his commentary from VĀCHESPATI'S.

The scholiasts of the *Cāricā* have, in more than one place, noticed the text of the *sūtras*; thus formally admitting the authority of the aphorisms. The excellence of the memorial verses (*Cāricā*), with the gloss of GAUḌA-PĀDA, and that of VĀCHESPATI MĪŚRA, has been the occasion of both collections of aphorisms (*Tatwa samāsa* and *Sānc'hya-pravachana*) falling into comparative neglect. They are superseded for a text book of the sect by IŚVARA-CRĪSHṆĀ'S clearer and more compendious work. Both *sūtras* and *cāricā* may be considered to be genuine and authoritative expositions of the doctrine; and the more especially, as they do not, upon any material point, appear to disagree.

The several works before-mentioned, are the principal works in which the *Sānc'hya* philosophy may be now studied. Others, which are cited by scholiasts, may possibly be yet forthcoming. But they are at least scarce, and no sufficient account of them can be given upon the strength of a few scattered quotations. Among them, however, may be named the *Rāja-vārtica* to which reference is made, as to a work held in much estimation, and which appears to comprise annotations on the *sūtras*; and the *Sangraha*, which is cited for parallel passages explanatory of the text, being an abridged exposition of the same doctrines, in the form of a select compilation.

Concerning the presumable antiquity of either CAPILA'S aphorisms, or IŚVARA-CRĪSHṆĀ'S memorial couplets, I shall here only remark, that notices of them, with quotations from both, do occur in philosophical treatises of other schools; whereby their authenticity is so far established.

Besides the *Sānc'hya* of CAPILA and his followers, another system, bearing the same denomination, but more usually termed the *Yōga-śāstra*, or *Yōga-sūtra*, as before remarked, is ascribed to a mythological being, PATANJALI, the supposed author of the great grammatical commentary emphatically

named the *Mahābhāṣya*, and likewise of a celebrated medical treatise termed *Characa*, and other distinguished performances.

The collection of *Yōga-sūtras*, bearing the common title of *Sānc'hya pravachana*, is distributed into four chapters or quarters (*pāda*): the first on contemplation (*samād'hi*); the second on the means of its attainment; the third on the exercise of transcendent power (*vibhūti*); the fourth on abstraction or spiritual insulation (*caiwalya*).

An ancient commentary on this fanatical work is forthcoming, entitled *Pātānjala-bhāṣya*. It is attributed to *Vēda-vyāsa*, the compiler of the Indian scriptures, and founder of the *Vēdānti* school of philosophy. *VĀCHESPATI MĪSRA* has furnished scholia on both text and gloss. This scholiast has been already noticed as an eminent interpreter of the *Cāricā*: and the same remark is here applicable, that the multiplicity of copies indicates the estimation in which his gloss is held above other scholia.

Another commentary is by *VIJNYĀNA-BHICSHU* before mentioned. He refers to it in his other works under the name of *Yōga-vārtica*. It probably is extant: for quotations from it occur in modern compilations.

A third commentary denominated *Rāja-mārtaṇḍa* is ascribed in its preface and epigraph to *RAĀA-RANGA-MALLA*, surnamed *BHÓJA-RĀJA* or *BHÓJA-PATI*, sovereign of *Dhārā*, and therefore called *Dhārés'wara*. It was probably composed at his court, under his auspices; and his name has been affixed to it in compliment to him, as is no uncommon practice. It is a succinct and lucid exposition of the text.

An ampler commentary by a modern *Mahārāshtriya Brahman*, named *NĀGÓJĪ-BHATTA UPĀD'HYĀYA*, bears the title of *Patanjali-sūtra-vṛitti*. It is very copious and very clear.

The tenets of the two schools of the *Sānc'hya* are on many, not to say on most, points, that are treated in both, the same; differing however upon one, which is the most important of all: the proof of existence of supreme God.

The one school (*PATANJALI*'s) recognising God is therefore denominated theistical (*sés'wara sānc'hya*). The other, (*CAPILA*'s) is atheistical, (*nirís'wara-sānc'hya*) as the sects of *Jina* and *Buddha* in effect are: acknowledging no creator of the universe, nor supreme ruling providence. The gods of *CAPILA* are beings superior to man; but, like him, subject to change and transmigration.

A third school, denominated *Paurāṇica sānc'hya*, considers nature as an illusion : conforming upon most other points to the doctrine of PATANJALI, and upon many, to that of CAPILA. In several of the *Purānas*, as the *Matsya*, *Cūrma* and *Vishṇu*, in particular, the cosmogony, which is an essential part of an Indian theogony, is delivered consonantly to this system. That, which is found at the beginning of MENV's institutes of law, is not irreconcilable to it.*

Doctrine of the Sānc'hya.

THE professed design of all the schools of the *Sānc'hya*, theistical, atheistical, and mythological, as of other Indian systems of philosophy, is to teach the means by which eternal beatitude may be attained after death, if not before it:

In a passage of the *Vēdas*, it is said, "Soul is to be known, it is to be discriminated from nature : thus it does not come again ; it does not come again."† Consonantly to this, and to numberless other passages of a like import, the whole scope of the *Vēdānta* is to teach a doctrine, by the knowledge of which, an exemption from metempsychosis shall be attainable ; and to inculcate that as the grand object to be sought, by means indicated.

Even in the aphorisms of the *Nyāya*‡ the same is proposed as the reward of a thorough acquaintance with that philosophical arrangement.

In like manner the Grecian philosophers, and Pythagoras and Plato in particular, taught that "the end of philosophy is to free the mind from incumbrances which hinder its progress towards perfection, and to raise it to the contemplation of immutable truth," and "to disengage it from all animal passions, that it may rise above sensible objects to the contemplation of the world of intelligence."§

In all systems of the *Sānc'hya* the same purpose is propounded. "Future pain," says PATANJALI, "is to be prevented. . . A clear knowledge of discriminate truth is the way of its prevention."||

It is true knowledge, as CAPILA and his followers insist,¶ that alone can secure entire and permanent deliverance from evil : whereas temporal means, whether for exciting pleasure, or for relieving mental and bodily

* *Menu*, l. 14—19.

† *Gaud. on Cār.*

‡ *Gōt. sūtr.*

§ *Enfield's Hist. of Phil.* l. 382 and 233.

|| *Pat.* 2. 16 and 26.

¶ *Cap.* l. 1. *Car.* l.

sufferance, are insufficient to that end ; and the spiritual resources of practical religion are imperfect ; since sacrifice, the most efficacious of observances, is attended with the slaughter of animals, and consequently is not innocent and pure ; and the heavenly meed of pious acts is transitory.*

In support of these positions, passages are cited from the *Védas* declaring in express terms the attainment of celestial bliss by celebration of sacrifices : “ Whoever performs an *aśwa méd’ha*-(or immolation of a horse) conquers all worlds ; overcomes death ; expiates sin ; atones for sacrilege.” In another place, *INDRA* and the rest of the subordinate deities, are introduced exulting on their acquisition of bliss. “ We have drunk the juice of *asclepias*,† and are become immortal ; we have attained effulgence ; we have learned divine truths. How can a foe harm us ? How can age affect the immortality of a deathless being ?”‡ Yet it appears in divers parts of the Indian scriptures, that, according to *Hindu* theology, even those deities, though termed immortal, have but a definite duration of life, perishing with the whole world, at its periodical dissolution. “ Many thousands of *Indras* and of other Gods have passed away, in successive periods, overcome by time : for time is hard to overcome.”§

Complete and perpetual exemption from every sort of ill is the beatitude which is proposed for attainment by acquisition of perfect knowledge. “ Absolute prevention of all three sorts of pain,” as an aphorism of the *Sānc’hya* intimates, “ is the highest purpose of soul.”|| Those three sorts are evil proceeding from self, from external beings, or from divine causes : the first is either bodily, as disease of various kinds ; or mental, as cupidity, anger, and other passions : the two remaining sorts arise from external sources ; one excited by some mundane being ; the other, by the agency of a being of a superior order, or produced by a fortuitous cause.

True and perfect knowledge, by which deliverance from evil of every kind is attainable, consists in rightly discriminating the principles, perceptible and imperceptible, of the material world, from the sensitive and cognitive principle which is the immaterial soul. Thus the *Cáricá* premises, that “ the inquiry concerns means of precluding the three sorts of pain : for pain is embarrassment. Nor is the inquiry superfluous, because obvious means of alleviation exist : for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.

* Car. 1.

‡ Gaud. on Car. 2.

† *Sóma* ; the moon-plant. *Asclepias acida*.§ *Ibid*.|| *San. prav.* l. 1.

The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual: for it is impure; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method, different from both, is preferable, consisting in a discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one; and of the thinking soul.”*

The revealed mode, to which allusion is here made, is not theological doctrine, with the knowledge of first principles, insuring exemption from transmigration; but performance of religious ceremonies enjoined in the practical *Védas*; and especially the immolation of victims, for which a heavenly reward, a place among the Gods, is promised.

It is not pure, observes the scholiast, for it is attended with the slaughter of animals, which, if not sinful in such cases, is, to say the least, not harmless. The merit of it, therefore, is of a mixed nature. A particular precept expresses “slay the consecrated victim:” but a general maxim ordains “hurt no sentient being.” It is defective, since even the Gods, *INDRA* and the rest, perish at the appointed period. It is in other respects excessive, since the felicity of one is a source of unhappiness to another.

Visible and temporal means, to which likewise reference is made in the text, are medicine and other remedies for bodily ailment; diversion alleviating mental ills; a guard against external injury; charms for defence from accidents. Such expedients do not utterly preclude sufferance. But true knowledge, say Indian philosophers, does so; and they undertake to teach the means of its attainment.

By three kinds of evidence, exclusive of intuition, which belongs to beings of a superior order, demonstration is arrived at, and certainty is attained, by mankind: namely, perception, inference, and affirmation.† All authorities among the *Sánc’hyas* (*PATANJALI* and *CAPILA*, as well as their respective followers) concur in asserting these. Other sources of knowledge, admitted in different systems of philosophy, are reducible to these three. Comparison, or analogy, which the logicians of *GÓTAMA*’s school add to that enumeration, and tradition and other arguments, which *JAIMINI* maintains (*viz.* capacity, aspect, and privation of four sorts, antecedent, reciprocal, absolute, and total,) are all comprehended therein. Other philosophers, who recognise fewer sources of knowledge, as *CHÁRVÁKA*, who acknowledges percep-

* *Car.* 1. and 2, with Scholia. † *Car.* 4. *Pat.* 1. 7. *Cap.* 1.

tion only, and the *Vaiśēshikas*, who disallow tradition, are rejected as insufficient authorities.*

Inference is of three sorts, equally admitted by the schools of the *Sānc'hya* and GÓTAMĀ's *Nyāya*; and in all distinguished by the same denominations. The consideration of them more properly belongs to the dialectic philosophy, than to this; and may therefore be postponed. It will be here sufficient to state the simplest explanation furnished by scholiasts of the *Cáricá* and *Sútras*, without going into the differences which occur in their expositions.

One sort, then, is the inference of an effect from a cause: the second is that of a cause from an effect; the third is deduced from a relation other than that of cause and effect. Examples of them are, 1st, rain anticipated from a cloud seen gathering. 2d. Fire concluded on a hill, whence smoke ascends. 3d. A flower's appropriate colour presumed where its peculiar scent is noticed; or motion of the moon's orb, deduced from observation of it in different aspects; or saltness of the sea, concluded from that of a sample of sea water; or bloom surmised on mangoe-trees in general, when an individual mangoe tree is found in blossom.

In regard to the third kind of evidence, tradition or right affirmation,† explained as intending true revelation,‡ commentators understand it to mean the *Vēdas* or sacred writ, including the recollections of those gifted mortals, who remember passages of their former lives, and call to mind events which occurred to them in other worlds; and excluding, on the other hand, pretended revelations of impostors and barbarians.

In a dialogue cited from the *Vēdas*, one of the interlocutors, the holy JAIGÍSHAVYA, asserts his presence, and consequent recollection of occurrences, through ten renovations of the universe (*Mahásarga*).

In a more extended sense, this third kind of evidence is the affirmation of any truth; and comprises every mode of oral information or verbal communication, whence knowledge of a truth may be drawn.

From these three sources, by the right exercise of judgment and due application of reasoning, true knowledge is derived; consisting in a discriminative acquaintance with principles: which, in the *Sānc'hya* system, are reckoned to be not less than twenty-five; viz.

* Com. on Car. 5.

† Pat. 1. 7.

‡ Car. 4. and 5.

1. Nature, *Pracriti* or *Mūla-pracriti*, the root or plastic origin of all: termed *Prad'hāna* the chief one: the universal, material cause; identified by the cosmogony of the *Purāṇas* (in several of which the *Sānc'hya* philosophy is followed) with *Māyā* or illusion; and, by mythologists, with *Brāhmī* the power or energy of *Brahmd*. It is eternal matter, undiscrète; undistinguishable, as destitute of parts; inferrible, from its effects: being productive, but no production.

2. Intelligence, called *Budd'hi* and *Mahat* or the great one: the first production of nature, increate, prolific; being itself productive of other principles. It is identified by the mythological *Sānc'hya* with the *Hindu* triad of Gods. A very remarkable passage of the *Matsya-purāna* cited in the *Sānc'hya-sāra*, after declaring that the *great* principle is produced "from modified nature," proceeds to affirm, "that the *great* one becomes distinctly known, as three Gods, through the influence of the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness; 'being one person, and three Gods,' (*éca mūrtis trayā dévāh*) namely, BRAHMĀ, VISHNŪ, and MAHÉŚWARA. In the aggregate it is the deity; but, distributive, it appertains to individual beings."

3. Consciousness, termed *Ahancāra*, or more properly egotism, which is the literal sense of the term: the peculiar and appropriate function of it is (*abhimāna*) selfish conviction, a belief that, in perception and meditation, "I" am concerned; that the objects of sense concern ME; in short, that I AM. It proceeds from the intellectual principle, and is productive of those which follow.

4—8. Five subtile particles, rudiments, or atoms, denominated *Tanmātra*; perceptible to beings of a superior order, but unapprehended by the grosser senses of mankind: derived from the conscious principle, and themselves productive of the five grosser elements; earth, water, fire, air, and space.

9—19. Eleven organs of sense and action; which also are productions of the conscious principle. Ten are external: viz. five of sense, and five of action. The eleventh is internal, an organ both of sense and of action, termed *manas* or mind. The five instruments of sensation are, the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. The five instruments of action are, 1st, voice, or the organ of speech; 2d, the hands; 3d, the feet; 4th, the excretory termination of the intestines; 5th, the organ of generation.

Mind, serving both for sense and action, is an organ by affinity, being cognate with the rest.

These eleven organs, with the two principles of intelligence and consciousness, are thirteen instruments of knowledge: three internal, and ten external, likened to three warders and ten gates.*

An external sense perceives; the internal one examines; consciousness makes the selfish application; and intellect resolves: an external organ executes.

20—24. Five elements, produced from the five elementary particles or rudiments. 1st, A diffused, ethereal fluid (*ácása*), occupying space: it has the property of audibleness, being the vehicle of sound, derived from the sonorous rudiment or ethereal atom. 2d, Air, which is endued with the properties of audibleness and tangibility, being sensible to hearing and touch; derived from the tangible rudiment, or aerial atom. 3d, Fire, which is invested with properties of audibleness, tangibility, and colour; sensible to hearing, touch, and sight: derived from the colouring rudiment, or igneous atom. 4th, Water, which possesses the properties of audibleness, tangibility, colour and savour; being sensible to hearing, touch, sight, and taste: derived from the savoury rudiment, or aqueous atom. 5th, Earth, which unites the properties of audibleness, tangibility, colour, savour, and odour; being sensible to hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell: derived from the odorous rudiment, or terrene atom.

25. Soul, termed *Purusha*, *Pumas*, or *Atman*; which is neither produced nor productive. It is multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, unalterable, immaterial.

The theistical *Sānc'hya* recognises the same principles; understanding, however, by *Purusha*, not individual soul alone, but likewise God (*Íśwara*), the ruler of the world.

These twenty-five principles are summarily contrasted in the *Cáricá*. "Nature, root of all, is no production. Seven principles; the GREAT or intellectual one, &c.; are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production, nor productive."†

To this passage a close resemblance will be remarked in one which occurs at the beginning of ERIGENA's treatise *De Divisione Naturæ*, where he distinguishes these four: "That which creates and is not created; that which

* Car. 32—35.

† Car. 3.

is created and creates; that which is created and creates not; and that which neither creates nor is created.”*

In several of the *Upanishads* of the *Védas* a similar distribution is affirmed, viz., “eight productive principles, and sixteen productions.”†

It is for contemplation of nature, and for abstraction from it, that union of soul with nature takes place, as the halt and the blind join for conveyance and for guidance: (one bearing and directed, the other borne and directing). By that union of soul and nature, creation, consisting in the development of intellect, and the rest of the principles, is effected.

The soul's wish is fruition, or liberation. For either purpose, it is in the first place invested with a subtile person, towards the formation of which the evolution of principles proceeds no further than the elementary rudiments.‡ This is composed then of intellect, consciousness, and mind, as well as the rest of the organs and instruments of life, conjoined with particles, or elementary rudiments, of five sorts: thus seventeen principles enter into its composition.§

This person, or subtile frame, termed *linga*, *linga-saríra*, or *súcshma-saríra*, is primeval, produced from original nature at the earliest or initial development of principles. It is unconfined; too subtile for restraint or hindrance (and thence termed *atívdhica*, surpassing the wind in swiftness): incapable of enjoyment, until it be invested with a grosser body, affected nevertheless by sentiments.

This is termed the rudimental creation (*tanmátra-sarga*).

The notion of an animated atom seems to be a compromise between the refined dogma of an immaterial soul, and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual existence, unattached to matter.

The grosser body, with which a soul clad in its subtile person is invested for the purpose of fruition, is composed of the five elements; or of four, excluding the etherial, according to some authorities; or of one, earth alone, according to others.|| That grosser body, propagated by generation, is perishable. The subtile person is more durable, transmigrating through successive bodies, which it assumes, as a mimic shifts his disguises, to represent various characters.

* J. Scoti. *Erigenæ de div. nat.* lib. 5. † *Garbha*, *Pras'na* and *Maitrêya Upanishads*.

‡ *Cár.* 40.

§ *Cap.* 3. 8.

|| *Cap.* 3. 16—18.

According to CAPILA,* as he is interpreted by his scholiast, there is immediately a corporeal frame composed of the five elements, but tenuous or refined. It is termed *anusht'hána saríra*, and is the vehicle of the subtile person.

It is this, rather than the subtile person itself, which in PATANJALI'S *Yóga sástra* is conceived to extend, like the flame of a lamp over its wick, to a small distance above the skull.

The corporeal creation (*bhautica-sarga*), consisting of souls invested with gross bodies, comprises eight orders of superior beings, and five of inferior; which, together with man, who forms a class apart, constitute fourteen orders of beings, distributed in three worlds, or classes.

The eight superior orders of beings bear appellations familiar to Hindu theology : *Brahma*, *Prajápatís*, *Indras*, *Pitrís*, *Gand'harvas*, *Yacshas*, *Rácshasas*, and *Pisáchas* ; gods or demi-gods, demons and evil spirits.

The inferior orders of beings are quadrupeds, distinguished in two orders; birds; reptiles, fishes, and insects; vegetables and unorganic substances.

Above is the abode of goodness, peopled by beings of superior orders; virtue prevails there, and consequent bliss, imperfect however, inasmuch as it is transient. Beneath is the abode of darkness or illusion, where beings of an inferior order dwell; stolidity or dulness is there prevalent. Between is the human world, where foulness or passion predominates, attended with continual misery.

Throughout these worlds, sentient soul experiences ill arising from decay and death, until it be finally liberated from its union with person.

Besides the grosser corporeal creation and the subtile or personal, all belonging to the material world, the *Sánc'hya* distinguishes an intellectual creation (*pratyaya-sarga* or *bháva-sarga*); consisting of the affections of intellect, its sentiments or faculties, which are enumerated in four classes, as obstructing, disabling, contenting, or perfecting the understanding; and amount to fifty.

Obstructions of the intellect are error, conceit, passion, hatred, fear: which are severally denominated obscurity, illusion, extreme illusion, gloom, and utter darkness. These again are subdivided into sixty-two sorts: error comprising eight species; illusion, as many; extreme illusion, ten; gloom, eighteen; and utter darkness, the same number.

* *Cár.* 3. 10. 11.

Error, or obscurity, mistakes irrational nature, intellect, consciousness, or any one of the five elementary atoms, for the soul, and imagines liberation to consist in absorption into one of those eight prolific principles.

Conceit, termed illusion, imagines transcendent power, in any of its eight modes, to be deliverance from evil. Thus beings of a superior order, as *Indra* and the rest of the gods, who possess transcendent power of every sort, conceive it to be perpetual, and believe themselves immortal.

Passion, called extreme illusion, concerns the five objects of sense; sound, tact, colour, savour, and odour; reckoned to be twice as many, as different to man and to superior beings.

Envy, or hatred, denominated gloom, relates to the same ten objects of sense, and to eight-fold transcendent power, furnishing the means of their enjoyment.

Fear, named utter darkness, regards the same eighteen subjects, and consists in the dread of ill attendant on their loss by death or by deprivation of power.

Disability of intellect, which constitutes the second class, comprising twenty-eight species, arises from defect or injury of organs, which are eleven: and to these eleven sorts are added the contraries of the two next classes, containing, the one nine, and the other eight species, making a total of twenty-eight. Deafness, blindness, deprivation of taste, want of smell, numbedness, dumbness, handlessness, lameness, costiveness, impotence, and madness, are disabilities preventing performance of functions.

Content, or acquiescence, which forms the third class, is either internal or external: the one four-fold, the other five-fold; viz. *internal*, 1st, concerning nature; as, an opinion that a discriminative knowledge of nature is a modification of that principle itself, with a consequent expectation of deliverance by the act of nature. 2d, Concerning the proximate cause; as a belief that ascetic observances suffice to ensure liberation. 3d, Concerning time; as a fancy that deliverance will come in course, without study. 4th, Concerning luck; as a supposition that its attainment depends on destiny. *External* acquiescence relates to abstinence from enjoyment upon temporal motives: namely, 1st, aversion from the trouble of acquisition; or, 2d, from that of preservation; and, 3d, reluctance to incur loss consequent on use; or, 4th, evil attending on fruition; or, 5th, offence of hurting objects by the enjoyment of them.

The perfecting of the intellect is the fourth class, and comprises eight species. Perfection consists in the prevention of evil; and this being three-

fold, its prevention is so likewise : as is the consequent perfection of the understanding. This is direct. The remaining five species are indirect, *viz.* reasoning ; oral instruction ; study ; amicable intercourse ; and purity, internal and external (or, according to another interpretation, liberality). They are means of arriving at perfection.

The *Sānc'hya*, as other Indian systems of philosophy, is much engaged with the consideration of what is termed the three qualities (*guṇa*) : if indeed quality be here the proper import of the term ; for the scholiast of CAPILA understands it as meaning, not quality or accident, but substance, a modification of nature, fettering the soul ; conformably with another acceptation of *guṇa*, signifying a cord.*

The first, and highest, is goodness (*sattwa*). It is alleviating, enlightening, attended with pleasure and happiness : and virtue predominates in it. In fire it is prevalent ; wherefore flame ascends, and sparks fly upwards. In man, when it abounds, as it does in beings of a superior order, it is the cause of virtue.

The second and middlemost is foulness or passion (*rajas* or *téjas*). It is active, urgent and variable ; attended with evil and misery. In air it predominates : wherefore wind moves transversely. In living beings it is the cause of vice.

The third and lowest is darkness (*tamas*). It is heavy and obstructive : attended with sorrow, dulness, and illusion. In earth and water it predominates, wherefore they fall or tend downwards. In living beings it is the cause of stolidity.

These three qualities are not mere accidents of nature, but are of its essence, and enter into its composition. "We speak of the qualities of nature, as we do of the trees of a forest," say the *Sānc'hya*s.† In the *Védas* they are pronounced to be successive modifications, one of the other : "All was darkness : commanded to change, darkness took the taint of foulness : and this, again commanded, assumed the form of goodness."

They co-operate for a purpose, by union of opposites : as a lamp, which is composed of oil, a wick, and flame,‡ substances inimical and contrary.

Taking the three qualities by which nature is modified, for principles or categories, the number, before enumerated, is raised to twenty-eight ; as is by some authorities maintained.§

* *Vijnyán.* on *Cap.* 1. 60.

† *Sānc'hya-sāra.*

‡ *Cár.* 13.

§ *Vijnyána bhicshu* in *Sānc'hya-sāra* and *Capila-bhāshya.*

To the intellect appertain eight modes, effects, or properties : four partaking of goodness ; namely, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power ; and four, which are the reverse of those, and partake of darkness, *viz.* sin, error, incontinency, and powerlessness.

Virtue here intends moral or religious merit. Knowledge is either exterior or interior ; that is, temporal or spiritual. Interior or spiritual knowledge discriminates soul from nature, and operates its deliverance from evil. Exterior or temporal knowledge comprehends holy writ, and every science, but self-knowledge.

Dispassion likewise is either exterior or interior ; as proceeding from a temporal motive, aversion from trouble ; or a spiritual impulse, the conviction that nature is a dream, a mere juggle and illusion.

Power is eight-fold : consisting in the faculty of shrinking into a minute form, to which every thing is pervious ; or enlarging to a gigantic body ; or assuming levity (rising along a sunbeam to the solar orb) ; or possessing unlimited reach of organs (as touching the moon with the tip of a finger) ; or irresistible will (for instance, sinking into the earth, as easily as in water) : dominion over all beings animate or inanimate ; faculty of changing the course of nature ; ability to accomplish every thing desired.

The notion, that such transcendent power is attainable by man in this life, is not peculiar to the *Sānc'hya* sect. It is generally prevalent among the Hindus ; and amounts to a belief of magic. A *Yógi*, imagined to have acquired such faculties, is, to vulgar apprehension, a sorcerer, and is so represented in many a drama and popular tale.

One of the four chapters of PATANJALI'S *Yóga-sāstra* (the third), relates almost exclusively to this subject, from which it takes its title. It is full of directions for bodily and mental exercises, consisting of intensely profound meditation on special topics, accompanied by suppression of breath, and restraint of the senses, while steadily maintaining prescribed postures. By such exercises, the adept acquires the knowledge of every thing past and future, remote or hidden ; he divines the thoughts of others, gains the strength of an elephant, the courage of a lion, and the swiftness of the wind ; flies in the air, floats in water, dives into the earth, contemplates all worlds at one glance, and performs other strange feats.

But neither power, however transcendent, nor dispassion, nor virtue, however meritorious, suffices for the attainment of beatitude. It serves but to prepare the soul for that absorbed contemplation, by which the great purpose of deliverance is to be accomplished.

The promptest mode of attaining beatitude, through absorbed contemplation, is devotion to God; consisting in repeated muttering of his mystical name, the syllable *om*, at the same time meditating its signification. It is this which constitutes efficacious devotion, whereby the deity, propitiated, confers on the votary the boon that is sought; precluding all impediments; and effecting the attainment of an inward sentiment, that prepares the soul for liberation.

“God, *ÍŚVARA*, the supreme ruler,” according to *PATANJALI*,* “is a soul or spirit, distinct from other souls; unaffected by the ills with which they are beset; unconcerned with good or bad deeds and their consequences, and with fancies or passing thoughts. In him is the utmost omniscience. He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning, (the deities of mythology); himself infinite, unlimited by time.”

CAPILA, on the other hand, denies an *ÍŚVARA*, ruler of the world by volition: alleging that there is no proof of God’s existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred from reasoning, nor yet revealed.† He acknowledges indeed a being issuing from nature, who is intelligence absolute; source of all individual intelligences; and origin of other existences successively evolved and developed. He expressly affirms, “that the truth of such an *ÍŚVARA* is demonstrated:”‡ the creator of worlds, in such sense of creation: for “the existence of effects,” he says, “is dependent upon consciousness, not upon *ÍŚVARA*,” and “all else is from the great principle, intellect.”§ Yet that being is finite; having a beginning and an end; dating from the grand development of the universe, to terminate with the consummation of all things. But an infinite being, creator and guide of the universe by volition, *CAPILA* positively disavows.|| “Detached from nature, unaffected therefore by consciousness, and the rest of nature’s trammels, he could have no inducement to creation; fettered by nature, he could not be capable of creation. Guidance requires proximity, as the iron is attracted by the magnet; and in like manner, it is by proximity that living souls govern individual bodies, enlightened by animation as hot iron is by heat.”

Passages of admitted authority, in which God is named, relate, according to *CAPILA* and his followers, either to a liberated soul, or to a mythological

* *Yóga sástra* 1. 23—24 and 26—29.

† *Cap.* 1. 91—98; 3. 52—55; 5. 2—12; and 6. 64—78.

‡ *Cap.* 3. 55.

§ *Cap.* 6. 65 and 66.

|| *Cap.* 1.

deity, or that superior not supreme being whom mythology places in the midst of the mundane egg.

Such is the essential and characteristic difference of CAPILA's and PATANJALI's, the atheistical and deistical, *Sānc'hyas*.

In less momentous matters they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree, in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. PATANJALI's *Yōga-sāstra* is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind. CAPILA is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mistaken in its conclusions.

The manner, in which a knowledge of those principles or categories that are recognised by the *Sānc'hyas*, may be acquired, is set forth in the *Cáricá* : "Sensible objects become known by perception. It is by inference or reasoning, that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is attained. And a truth, which is neither to be directly perceived nor to be inferred by reasoning, is deduced from revelation. For various causes, things may be imperceptible or unperceived; distance, nearness, minuteness; confusion, concealment; predominance of other matters; defect of organs or inattention. It is owing to the subtlety of nature, not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect and the rest of the derivative principles are effects; whence it is concluded as their cause; in some respects analogous, but in others dissimilar.*"

"Effect subsists antecedently to the operation of cause:" a maxim not unlike that ancient one that "nothing comes of nothing," for it is the material, not the efficient, cause, which is here spoken of.

The reasons alleged by the *Sānc'hyas*† are, that "what exists not, can by no operation of a cause be brought into existence:" that is, effects are educts, rather than products. Oil is in the seed of sesamum, before it is expressed; rice is in the husk before it is peeled; milk is in the udder before it is drawn. "Materials, too, are selected, which are apt for the purpose:" milk, not water, is taken to make curds. "Every thing is not by every means possible:" cloth, not earthen ware, may be made with yarn. "What

* *Cár.* 6, 8.

† *Cár.* 9.

is capable, does that, to which it is competent :” a potter does not weave cloth, but makes a jar, from a lump of clay, with a wheel and other implements. “The nature of cause and effect is the same :” a piece of cloth does not essentially differ from the yarn of which it is wove ; as an ox does from a horse : barley, not rice or peas, grows out of barley-corns.

“There is a general cause, which is undistinguishable.”* This position is supported by divers arguments. “Specific objects are finite ;” they are multitudinous and not universal : there must then be a single all-pervading cause. Another argument is drawn from affinity : “homogeneousness indicates a cause.” An earthen jar implies a lump of clay of which it is made : a golden coronet presumes a mass of gold of which it was fabricated : seeing a rigidly abstemious novice, it is readily concluded, says the scholiast, that his parents are of the sacerdotal tribe. There must then be a cause bearing affinity to effects which are seen. Another reason is “existence of effects through energy :” there must be a cause adequate to the effects. A potter is capable of fabricating pottery : he makes a pot, not a car, nor a piece of cloth. The main argument of the *Sānc’hya*s on this point is “the parting or issuing of effects from cause, and the re-union of the universe.” A type of this is the tortoise, which puts forth its limbs, and again retracts them within its shell. So at the general destruction, or consummation of all things, taking place at an appointed period, the five elements, earth, water, fire, air, and ether, constituting the three worlds, are withdrawn in the inverse order of that in which they proceeded from the primary principles, returning step by step to their first cause, the *chief* and undistinguishable one, which is nature.

It operates by means of the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness. It does so by mixture ; as the confluence of three streams forms one river ; for example, the Ganges : or as threads interwoven constitute a piece of cloth : and as a picture is a result of the union of pigments. It operates “by modification” too : as water, dropped from a cloud, absorbed by the roots of plants, and carried into the fruit, acquires special flavour, so are different objects diversified by the influence of the several qualities respectively. Thus, from one *chief* cause, which is nature, spring three dissimilar worlds, observes the scholiast, peopled by gods enjoying bliss ; by men suffering pain ; by inferior animals affected with dullness. It is owing to

* *Cár.* 15. 16.

prevalence of particular qualities. In the gods, goodness prevails, and foulness and darkness are foreign : and therefore are the gods supremely happy. In man, foulness is prevalent ; and goodness and darkness are strangers : wherefore man is eminently wretched. In animals, darkness predominates ; and goodness and foulness are wanting : and therefore are animals extremely dull.

The existence of soul is demonstrated by several arguments.* “ The assemblage of sensible objects is for another’s use ;” as a bed is for a sleeper, a chair for a sitter : that other, who uses it, must be a sensitive being ; and the sensitive being is soul. The converse of sensible objects endued with the three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness, indiscriminate, common, inanimate, and prolific, must exist, devoid of qualities, discriminate, and so forth : and that is soul. “ There must be superintendence ;” as there is a charioteer to a car : the superintendent of inanimate matter is soul. “ There must be one to enjoy ” what is formed for enjoyment : a spectator, a witness of it : that spectator is soul. “ There is a tendency to abstraction :” the wise and unwise alike desire a termination of vicissitude : holy writ and mighty sages tend to that consummation ; the final and absolute extinction of every sort of pain : there must then be a being capable of abstraction, essentially unconnected with pleasure, pain, and illusion : and that being is soul.

There is not one soul to all bodies, as a string on which pearls are strung : but a separate soul for each particular body. “ Multitude of souls ” is proved by the following arguments.† “ Birth, death, and the instruments of life are allotted severally :” if one soul animated all bodies, one being born, all would be born ; one dying, all would die ; one being blind, or deaf, or dumb, all would be blind, or deaf, or dumb ; one seeing, all would see ; one hearing, all would hear ; one speaking, all would speak. Birth is the union of soul with instruments, namely intellect, consciousness, mind and corporeal organs ; it is not a modification of soul, for soul is unalterable. Death is its abandonment of them ; not an extinction of it ; for it is imperishable. Soul then is multitudinous. “ Occupations are not at one time universally the same :” if one soul animated all beings, then all bodies would be stirred by the same influence, but it is not so : some are engaged in virtue ; others occupied with vice ; some restraining passions ; others yielding

* *Cár.* 17.

† *Cár.* 18.

to them ; some involved in error ; others seeking knowledge. Souls therefore are numerous. "Qualities affect differently : " one is happy ; another miserable ; and again, another stupid. The gods are ever happy ; man, unhappy ; inferior animals, dull. Were there but one soul, all would be alike.

The attributes of the several principles, material and immaterial, discrete and undcrete, perceptible and imperceptible, are compared and contrasted. "A discrete principle," as is affirmed by the *Sānc'hyas*,* "is causable : " it is uneternal "inconstant," one while apparent, at another time evanescent : it is "unpervading," not entering into all ; for effect is possessed with its cause, not cause with its effect : it is acted upon, and "mutable," changing from one body to another : it is "multitudinous ;" for there are so many minds, intellects, &c., as there are souls animating bodies : it is "supported," resting upon its cause : it is involvable, "merging" one into another, and implying one, the other : it is "conjunct," consisting of parts or qualities, as sound, taste, smell, &c. : it is "governed," or dependent on another's will.

"The undcrete principle" is in all these respects the reverse : it is causeless ; eternal ; all pervading ; immutable, or unacted upon ; single, as being the one cause of three orders of beings ; unsupported (relying but on itself) ; uninvolvable (not merging, or implying) ; unconjunct, consisting of no parts ; self-ruled.

Discrete principles, as well as the undcrete one, have the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness : the one (nature) having them in its own right, as its form or properties ; the rest, because they are its effects : as black yarn makes black cloth. They are indiscriminating, or "indiscriminate ;" not distinguishing quality from quality, and confounding nature with qualities : for nature is not distinct from itself ; nor are qualities separate from it. They are "objects" of apprehension and enjoyment for every soul, external to discriminative knowledge, but subjects of it. They are "common" like an utensil, or like a harlot. They are "irrational" or unsentient ; unaware of pain or pleasure : from an insensible lump of clay comes an insensible earthen pot. They are "prolific ;" one producing or generating another : nature producing intellect, and intellect generating consciousness, and so forth.

* *Cār.* 10, 11.

Soul on the contrary is devoid of qualities ; it is discriminative ; it is no object of enjoyment ; it is several or peculiar ; it is sensitive, aware of pain and pleasure ; unprolific, for nothing is generated by it.

In these respects it differs from all the other principles : on certain points it conforms with the undiscrete principle, and differs from the discrete : in one regard it agrees with these and disagrees with the other : for it is not single, but on the contrary multitudinous ; and it is causeless, eternal, pervading, immutable, unsupported, unmerging or unimplying, unconjunct (consisting of no parts), self-governed.

The attributes of the perceptible, discrete principles and of the undiscrete, indefinite one, are considered to be proved* by the influence of the three qualities in one instance, and their absence in the converse ; and by conformity of cause and effect : an argument much and frequently relied upon. It concerns the material, not the efficient, cause.

From the contrast between soul and the other principles, it follows, as the *Cáricá*† affirms, that “soul is witness, bystander, spectator, solitary and passive. Therefore, by reason of union with it, insensible body seems sensible : and, though the qualities be active, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent.”

“ Though inanimate, nature performs the office of preparing the soul for its deliverance, in like manner as it is a function of milk, an unintelligent substance, to nourish the calf.”‡

Nature is likened to a female dancer, exhibiting herself to soul, as to an audience, and is reproached with shamelessness for repeatedly exposing herself to the rude gaze of the spectator. “ She desists, however, when she has sufficiently shown herself. She does so, because she has been seen ; he desists, because he has seen her. There is no further use for the world : yet the connexion of soul and nature still subsists.”§

By attainment of spiritual knowledge, through the study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, single truth is learned, so the *Cáricá* declares|| that “neither I AM, nor is aught MINE, nor I exist.”

“ All, which passes in consciousness, in intellect, is reflected by the soul, as an image which sullies not the crystal, but appertains not to it. Possessed of this self-knowledge, soul contemplates at ease nature thereby debarred

* *Cár.* 14.† *Cár.* 19, 20.‡ *Cár.* 75.§ *Car.* 59, 61, 66.|| *Cár.* 64.

from prolific change and precluded therefore from every other form and effect of intellect, but that spiritual saving knowledge.”*

“ Yet soul remains awhile invested with body ; as the potter’s wheel continues whirling, after the pot has been fashioned, by force of the impulse previously given to it. When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.”†

“ Thus,” concludes the *Cáricá*, “ this abstruse knowledge, adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint. The sage compassionately taught it to ASURI, who communicated it PANCHÁŚIC’HA ; and by him it was promulgated to mankind.”‡

* *Cár.* 65.

† *Cár.* 67, 68.

‡ *Cár.* 69, 70.